High on Uncertainty: ADA Accommodation and Hemp-Derived Substances After Anderson v. Diamondback Investment Group, LLC
Emma Lyles
In Anderson v. Diamondback Investment Group, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was confronted with a collision of federal disability law, state employment protections, and the rapidly evolving hemp industry. The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer, holding that Tonya Anderson failed to establish disability status under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and could not prove the legality of the hemp-derived products she consumed. Yet in doing so, the court issued a series of first-impression holdings that reach far beyond the facts of the case—defining “lawful products” under North Carolina law, construing the 2018 Farm Bill’s hemp provisions, and determining that THCO was not an illegal synthetic cannabinoid.
This Note argues that the Fourth Circuit overreached, both doctrinally and institutionally. The court’s majority opinion reflects the interpretive uncertainty created by the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which eliminated Chevron deference and allowed federal courts to resolve complex scientific and economic issues without agency guidance. As analyzed, the decision misapplied ADA precedent by imposing an evidentiary burden inconsistent with the statute’s remedial purpose and with Supreme Court holdings that reject paternalistic safety rationales for workplace exclusion. Furthermore, the court’s expansive reading of “hemp-derived” substances may spur regulatory fragmentation, consumer risk, and inconsistent treatment of workers and employers in various jurisdictions. The court should have exercised judicial restraint— limiting its holding to the employment issues before it and expressly calling for congressional or administrative clarification—rather than substituting judicial inference for scientific expertise.
Ultimately, Anderson illustrates the growing tension between textualism and technical expertise in post-Chevron jurisprudence. By resolving a complex question of chemical synthesis and statutory meaning without evidentiary support or institutional deference, the Fourth Circuit blurred the boundaries between interpretation and regulation. This Note urges a more balanced approach—one that preserves judicial fidelity to statutory text while recognizing the limits of judicial competence in scientifically specialized areas.