Maryland’s Second Look Act Turns a Blind Eye: An Examination of the Act’s Effectiveness as a Tool to Reduce Mass Incarceration

Sarah Moore

W.H. was released from prison in 2022 at the age of forty-seven. He was sentenced to life plus thirty years when he was sixteen. W.H. became eligible for early release under Maryland’s Juvenile Restoration Act (“JRA”)—enacted in 2021—and was one of twenty-four individuals granted sentence reductions during the first year of the JRA. When asked what he would like legislators to know, W.H. said, “[t]hat a child is a child, regardless of the crime that he’s committed.” The Office of the Public Defender interviewed W.H., one of several formerly incarcerated Marylanders interviewed for a report documenting the JRA’s first year. Nearly all of the people interviewed said they knew others still incarcerated who are just as worthy of early release, but were not eligible for relief under the JRA. K.M., another interviewee for the report, said “[t]here are a lot of brothers in there who deserve a second chance.”

In 2025, the Maryland General Assembly passed the Second Look Act, heeding the call to expand the age of eligibility for post-conviction review. The Second Look Act (“SLA”) is a positive contribution toward Maryland’s ongoing effort to mitigate the devastating impacts of overly lengthy prison sentences. Judicial review mechanisms like the SLA provide the opportunity to evaluate whether sentences imposed decades ago for crimes juveniles and young adults commit remain justifiable. This Comment will begin with an overview of the problems mass incarceration present in Maryland and a brief outline of the Supreme Court jurisprudence that prompted the second look movement. This Comment will then discuss the nationwide second look movement, the history of the JRA, and the SLA. This Comment will highlight the recent Supreme Court of Maryland decision in Trimble v. State as a predictive case study for how circuit courts will likely apply the SLA. Next, this Comment will identify three major flaws with the SLA. First, the General Assembly seriously erred by excluding life without parole sentences from eligibility under the SLA. Second, the SLA’s directive to circuit courts on how to analyze sentence-reduction motions is flawed in its flexibility, demonstrated by the precedent set in Trimble v. State. Finally, courts should be required to weigh an individual’s rehabilitation efforts more heavily than the SLA mandates. While the SLA is intended to provide individuals with a second chance at life outside of prison walls, its potential reach is significantly dampened by its shortcomings. Future legislative interventions should continue to expand, rather than restrict, opportunities for sentence review.